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A bloody crime
Interrogation room. 1 is the main suspect. 2 is the detective.
These are the only relevant pieces of information:
• c• f
• d• e
• b • a
a: “1 is innocent”
b: “1 was seen close to the crime scene”
c : “1 has a twin brother living in the city”
d : “1 works in a butcher’s nearby”
e: “1 was fired from the butcher’s a week ago”
f : “1’s twin brother was in Venice last night”
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Aim of the work
• Which arguments will be disclosed by agent 1 if he tries
to persuade 2 that he is innocent?
Thesis. It strongly
depends on what 1 thinks that 2 thinks about the
relevant information
• Previous work (e.g.(Rahwan and Larson, 2009; Sakama,
2012)) have ignored this fact
• What are the appropriate tools for capturing the
epistemic component of persuasion? Proposal: abstract
argumentation + awareness DEL
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AFs and Justification Status
Definition (Dung (1995))
An argumentation framework (AF) is a pair (A, ) where:
• A 6= ∅ and finite (arguments)
•  ⊆ A× A (attack relation)
a b is read as “a attacks b”
Including agents: a TAF is a tuple (A, ,A1,A2) where
Ai ⊆ A and i ′s subgraph is defined as (Ai , i) with
 i= ∩(Ai × Ai) for every i ∈ {1, 2}.
Pointed TAFs (A, ,A1,A2, a) where a ∈ A1 ∩ A2 are used to
represent debate scenarios about a.
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Justification Status
Definition (based on Wu et al. (2010))
The justification status of a for i is the outcome yielded by
the function JS i : A→ ℘({in, out, undec}) defined as:
JS i(a) := {Li(a) | L is a complete labelling of (Ai , i)}
JS∗ is the set of possible outcomes of JS, which naturally
defines an acceptance hierarchy:
strong acceptance {in} > {in, undec} > {undec} =
{in, out, undec} > {out, undec} > {out}strong rejection
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JS1(a) = JS2(a) = {out}




Definition (Persuasiveness of a set of arguments)
Let G = (A, ,A1,A2, a) and B ⊆ A1 the resulting pointed
TAF is GB := (A, ,A1,AB2 , a) where AB2 = A2 ∪ B . Let
goal ∈ JS∗, B is said to be persuasive iff JS2(a) = goal
w.r.t. GB
Persuasion is understood as a change in the hearer’s
justification status that matches the speaker’s intentions.
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Definition (Schwarzentruber et al. (2012))
An pointed model for (A, ,A1,A2) is (M,w) = ((W ,R,D),w)
where:
• W 6= ∅ (possible worlds) with w ∈W
• R : Ag→ ℘(W ×W ) (accessibility relations)
• D : (Ag ×W )→ ℘(A) (awareness function) s.t. D1(w) = A1
and D2(w) = A2.
1. If wRiu, then Di (w) ⊆ Di (u) (Positive Introspection)
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A communication pointed model
(M ,w)+b := ((W ,R,D+b),w) where
D+b : (Ag ×W )→ ℘(A) is defined by cases for each i ∈ Ag
and each v ∈ W as follows:





2 : {a, b, e}
w0
1 : A
2 : {a, b}
w1
1 : {a, b}







2 : {a, b, d , e}
w0
1 : A
2 : {a, b, d}
w1
1 : {a, b, d}










Figure 1: Communication Model
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Epistemic Persuasiveness
Definition (Epistemic-based persuasive arguments)
Let (M ,w) be a pointed model for (A, ,D1(w),D2(w), a),
let goal ∈ JS∗, we say that B ⊆ D1(w) is persuasive from
1’s perspective iff JS2(a) = goal w.r.t.
(D+B2 (w ′),  D+B2 (w ′)) for all w ′ ∈ W s.t. wR1w ′.
A set of arguments is epistemically persuasive iff it is thought
to be persuasive by the speaker.
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Plain Persuasion and Epistemic Persuasion
1 : A
2 : {a, b, d}
w0
1 : A
2 : {a, b, d}
w1
1 : {a, b, d}





1,2 Assume goal = {in}
Figure 2: (M,w0)+d
• {d} is persuasive from 1’s perspective in (M,w0)
• {d} is not actually persuasive
• goal = {in} is not achievable in (A,D+d1 (w0),D
+d
2 (w0), ),
but it was achievable before the action.
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A Logic for Argument Disclosure
Let A 6= ∅ and finite and define L+!(A)
ϕ ::= ownsi(a) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | iϕ | [+a]ϕ | [a!]ϕ
a ∈ A i ∈ {1, 2}
(M ,w)  ownsi(a) iff a ∈ Di(w)
(M ,w)  iϕ iff (M ,w ′)  ϕ ∀w ′ s.t. wRiw ′
(M ,w)  [a!]ϕ iff (M ,w)a!  ϕ
(M ,w)  [+a]ϕ iff (M ,w)+a  ϕ
where (M ,w)a! = ((W ,R,Da!),w) and Da!i (v) = Di(v) ∪ {a}
for all v ∈ W
15
A Logic for Argument Disclosure
Let A 6= ∅ and finite and define L+!(A)
ϕ ::= ownsi(a) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | iϕ | [+a]ϕ | [a!]ϕ
a ∈ A i ∈ {1, 2}
(M ,w)  ownsi(a) iff a ∈ Di(w)
(M ,w)  iϕ iff (M ,w ′)  ϕ ∀w ′ s.t. wRiw ′
(M ,w)  [a!]ϕ iff (M ,w)a!  ϕ
(M ,w)  [+a]ϕ iff (M ,w)+a  ϕ
where (M ,w)a! = ((W ,R,Da!),w) and Da!i (v) = Di(v) ∪ {a}
for all v ∈ W
15
Axioms
All propositional tautologies (Taut)
` i(ϕ→ ψ)→ (iϕ→ iψ) (K)
` ownsi(a)→ iownsi(a) (PI)
` ¬ownsi(a)→ i¬ownsj(a) (GNI)
Rules
From ϕ→ ψ and ϕ, infer ψ MP
From ϕ infer iϕ NEC
Table 1: Axioms for the static fragments
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Reduction Axioms
` [+a]ϕ↔ (owns1(a)→ [a!]ϕ) ∧ (¬owns1(a)→ ϕ) (Def+)
` [a!]ownsi (a)↔ > (Atoms=)
` [a!]ownsi (b)↔ ownsi (b) where a 6= b (Atoms 6=)
` [a!]¬ϕ↔ ¬[a!]ϕ (Negation)
` [a!](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([a!]ϕ ∧ [a!]ψ) (Conjunction)
` [a!]iϕ↔ i [a!]ϕ (Box)
From ϕ↔ ψ, infer δ ↔ δ[ϕ/ψ] SE
Table 2: Reduction Axioms for L+!(A)
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Plain Persuasiveness and Epistemic Persuasiveness
Proposition
Given a pointed model (M ,w) for (A, ,A1,A2, a), let B ⊆ A
be persuasive from the speaker’s perspective. Let
Ai := {ai ∈ A | M ,w  owns2(ai) ∧ ¬1owns2(ai)}.
If Ai 6 (D+B2 (w) \ Ai) then B is persuasive.
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New Advances and Future Work
Two main pending tasks
1. Capturing persuasive sets and EB-persuasive sets in the
object language:
• Including new kind of variables in the propositional
fragment to talk about the attack relation (following
(Doutre et al., 2014, 2017))and the belonging of each
argument to certain subsets
2. Dropping the assumption of credulous agents
• Studying new forms of update where the hearer behaves
more sceptically (for instance by privately learning an
attacker of the communicated argument)
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